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The usual conjecture that democracy discourages Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been widely refuted in empirical studies.  However, we find support of this view. We distinguish between civil and political liberties and we argue that multinational firms tend to invest in countries with low civil but with high political liberties. Furthermore, we show that the negative relationship between civil liberties and FDI is hump-shaped.  A threshold level of civil liberties exists, below which civil liberties repression is associated with more FDI. The results are explained by different economic motives for FDI in different groups of countries.
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This paper focuses on the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and political freedoms in developing countries.  The subject of multinationals’ motivations and their expansion to developing countries is still a fast growing field of research in the economic literature, perhaps due to the relatively small amount of FDI attracted by these countries.  The number, though, of developing countries as active players in the “international chessboard” (Eden and Lenway, 2001) and the share of FDI that these countries receive is increasing rapidly.  Given the role of FDI as a factor that promotes industrialization and development, especially when the incentives for domestic investment are weak, it is interesting to examine the role of the institutional and political environment in attracting FDI.
In this respect, the work of Rodrik (1996) is seminal, as he investigates the relation between democratic rights in various countries and the way they influence FDI  originated in the US.  His results support the hypothesis that countries with weaker democratic rights attract less US capital.  His study is the first to give a clear answer to a debate that started with Huntington and Dominguez (1975) who claim that autocratic rulers provide a better economic environment for both domestic and foreign investments since they are more able to enact efficiency-enhancing policies due to their non-democratic attributes.  However, Olson (1993) and McGuire and Olson (1996) suggest that there is a large risk of policy reversals in dictatorships and a lack of credibility of autocratic rulers.  This risk could deter investments, especially FDI.
Several subsequent studies have examined the impact of political and civil liberties on multinationals’ motives and decisions and vice versa.  Greider (1998) and Meyer (1998) draw similar conclusions, with the first one suggesting that FDI does not have a liberalising effect in autocratic countries and the second one going a step further and supporting that multinational enterprises (MNEs) are actually not only ”robbing” developing nations of their economic sovereignty but also support repressive regimes.  However, Harms and Ursprung (2002) do not find support for the argument that MNEs show a preference for undemocratic regimes.  Instead they propose that more individual freedom attracts FDI.  Busse (2004) confirms these results.   This link between protection of democratic rights and FDI is verified for the whole period back to the early 1970s.  There is also a tendency that MNEs, under the pressure of non-governmental organisations and the shift of FDI from primary sector to manufacturing and service activities, to change their investment behaviour towards countries that broaden the protection of political liberties.  Li and Resnick (2003) find an indirect relationship between increased democracy and FDI inflows. Using a sample of 53 developing countries for the period 1982-1995 they report that, after controlling for the positive impact of democratic institutions on FDI through improvements on private property rights protection, the final impact is actually negative.
This paper contributes to this discussion by assuming that political and economic liberties do not influence investment decisions in a similar way.  Democracy is not a one-dimensional issue; it may involve several other dimensions. For this reason one cannot treat political and civil liberties as perfect substitutes and simply measure democracy as the average or sum of them. We argue that, even though repression of civil liberties may give rise to an incentive for investment, repression of political liberties and non-democratic decision-making can result in the opposite effect.  
The second contribution of this paper is the blending of political economy with international business literature.  We use arguments emerging from international business to explain MNEs’ behaviour towards developing countries.  The incentives of MNEs to invest in a foreign country in the form of FDI are quite diverse and the MNEs’ preference towards more or less civil and political freedom repression may differ depending on those investment incentives. We argue that only when FDI is conducted in order to minimize cost, more civil liberties repression attracts more FDI. This effect, however, is not linear. A high degree of civil liberties repression may eventually deter FDI, whereas a low degree of civil repression may be an FDI-attracting factor. Moreover our econometric model shows that in countries where civil liberties are repressed, FDI no longer involves minimizing the cost of production, but aims predominantly at exploiting the natural resources of the economy.  Therefore civil liberties repression does not affect the FDI decision. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  The next section presents the basic conceptual framework.  Section 3 gives a brief description of the sample and data used. Then the results of our empirical exercise are presented in section 4.  Finally, section 5 concludes the paper, offering possible policy implications and extensions.

2. The basic conceptual framework 
To identify the link between repression of civil and political liberties and FDI, first we have to explain the MNEs investing activity. To do so we use a typology of strategic motivations for engaging in foreign production​[1]​, capturing market seeking (MS) and efficiency seeking (ES) motives. Market seeking involves primarily producing within a country to supply the local market, or probably a contiguous group of countries, or to learn about the real conditions of the local market prior to possible movement to more refined operations capturing efficiency-seeking behaviour (Pearce, 2004).​[2]​  Three distinct elements condition the choice of MS operations in a country; firstly, that the target market is a potentially profitable part of the enterprise's competitive environment; secondly, that there are reasons for supplying the market through local production rather than through trade; and thirdly, in the case of developing countries, the existence of a peculiarly prosperous elite. 
According to the efficiency-seeking motive, production of specific existing goods is relocated to a particular country with the main objective of sharpening the cost-efficiency of operations. This strategy will enable MNEs to enhance (or defend) their competitiveness in (usually higher-income) markets where they are already well established (Dunning, 1993; Hood and Young, 1979; Caves, 1971).  
Besides the main MNEs’ motivations, the level of FDI is also influenced by other factors (Marr, 1997 provides an extensive review). Sound macroeconomic policies in the host country (Lipsey, 1999 and Obwona, 2001), good public infrastructure (Obwona, 2001), efficient bureaucracy and low overall country risk (Wei, 2000 and Harms and Ursprung, 2002), and a highly educated workforce (Bengoa and Sanchez- Robles, 2003), are all factors that attract FDI. Moreover other country specific characteristics, like the legal system, the existence of raw materials, a colonial background etc. may also affect the FDI decision.
 Even though most of the above factors have been systematically analyzed as determinants of FDI, studies of the status of the political regime as a determinant of FDI are rather scarce (with the exception of Rodrik, 1996, Harms and Ursprung, 2002 and Busse, 2004). The long-standing debate, though, in the political economy literature about the effects of democracy on investment and economic growth (see Przeworski and Limongi, 1993 and Barro, 1997 for surveys) has shown that political institutions matter for investment and growth and thus it is interesting to investigate how FDI responds to different political regimes. Do democratic countries with higher civil and/or political liberties attract more FDI?
Democratic countries are characterized by high civil and political liberties. Even though democracy is a more complex issue, one can claim that the respect and indulgence of the civil and political liberties of the citizens are its most important aspects. Political liberties involve, as Gastil (1982) points out, the “…rights to participate meaningfully in the political process.  In a democracy this means the right of all adults to vote and compete for public office, and for elected representatives to have a decisive vote on public policies” (Gastil, 1982, p.7, emphasis added). Conversely, civil liberties ideals involve a series of various economic, political and civil liberties enjoyed by the citizens of the country, such as freedom of expression and belief, association and organization rights, rule of law and personal autonomy. Again in the words of Gastil “Civil liberties are rights to free expression, to organize or demonstrate, as well as rights to a degree of autonomy such as is provided by freedom of religion, education, travel, and other personal rights” (Gastil, 1982, p.7, emphasis added).
Even though higher civil and political liberties of course imply better democratic institutions, there is no reason to expect that these two liberties affect the investment motives of the MNEs alike. Civil liberties refer to the workplace environment and the organization rights of the workers and to various economic rights. In contrast, political liberties refer to the decision-making process in the country and the way the government chooses which policies to implement. 
This paper assumes that high repression of civil liberties is expected to exert a negative effect on the productivity of the workforce. In such an environment workers are not accustomed to taking initiatives, cannot co-operate effectively, and have lower incentives to be productive. This implies lower returns to foreign investments. In this case an increase in economic rights and civil liberties may stimulate the working of the free market, providing better outcomes for productivity and growth (Friedman, 1962). 
As civil liberties rise, the productivity of the workforce increases, but at the same time adverse powers may come into play. Labour unions and special interest groups begin to form and gain power increasing their ability to extract rents from the MNEs.  The above non- linear effect of a change in civil liberties on the level of FDI is similar to the non- linear relationship between civil liberties and growth verified in many empirical studies (see Przeworski and Limongi, 1993 and Barro, 1997).
Political liberties’ repression effect to FDI comes through a different channel.  It is established in the literature (Ferejohn, 1986; Drazen, 2000) that elections act as a disciplining device for the policymaker. When elections are free and fair, voters will punish the officeholders that deliver “bad” economic outcomes. This will induce the officeholder to provide sound economic policies. In support of the above argument, Olson (1993) and McGuire and Olson (1996), argue that non-democratic autocratic rulers have a shorter time horizon since policy changes, e.g. due to a violent revolution, are more frequent in non- democracies. 
The above suggest that in countries where political liberties are low – i.e. the electoral mechanism does not work efficiently – economic policies and outcomes are less efficient compared to policies in countries with high political liberties. Less efficient government policies have a negative effect on the returns of FDI, and therefore reduce the amount of FDI that a country receives.  
In the following section we test the empirical validity of our analysis with respect to the effects of civil and political liberties on FDI. 

3. Data description        
In order to test the relationship between civil and political liberties and FDI we employ a panel data-fixed effects analysis. We also report the results from the random effects, indicating them with a (b), which we use for a sensitivity analysis.  The Hausman statistic (Hausman, 1978) is also reported.  The coefficients estimated using fixed or random effects should not be different if the model is correctly specified and the null hypothesis of no correlation between the error term and the country effects cannot be rejected.  Comparing, thus, random with fixed effect estimation results can offer a sensitivity and robustness testing of the sign and significance of coefficients.
The sample involves a total of 105 developing and developed countries​[3]​ for the time period 1989-1997. The time dimension is limited by the unavailability of data for most of the developing countries. Our empirical exercise uses a log-linear equation, which is consistent with our theoretical background on the determinants of FDI. The dependent variable in all equations is Foreign Direct Investment flows from US firms normalized by GDP (FDIP).  The FDI data are taken from the US Census Bureau of Economic Analysis. The estimated equation takes the following form:

where i represents country, t represents time, μi is the fixed effect and εit the usual error term​[4]​.
We measure civil and political liberties using Gastil’s Index as published by the Freedom House foundation. Freedom House is a non-governmental organization that, since 1972, rates all countries according to their democratic institutions.  Two indices are reported, one for political rights and one for civil liberties. Each index takes a value from 1 to 7, with a rating of 1 for countries with political and civil liberties that come closest to the ideals and 7 for countries with absence of all democratic rights. The political repression index (POLITREP) is constructed according to the status of the elections and the constitutional role of the elected government in decision-making. The civil repression index (CIVILREP) measures the lack of various civil liberties. 
Given our arguments in the previous section about the different effect of CIVILREP and POLITREP on FDI, a natural question is whether POLITREP and CIVILREP are equal in our country sample. If POLITREP and CIVILREP are equal for most countries, even though they may induce different FDI motives, one cannot distinguish between the two in the econometric exercise. 
In figure 1 we present the relationship between (average across time) POLITREP and (average across time) CIVILREP in our country sample. In the horizontal axis we plot the civil liberties index and in the vertical axis the political liberties index. If POLITREP and CIVILREP were the same across countries, then all data points would lie on the 45o line (also depicted in figure 1). However figure 1 reveals that the majority of countries seem to lie well above or below the 45o line, meaning that POLITREP and CIVILREP are different. Testing the hypothesis that POLITREP and CIVILREP are equal the t-test results in a value of -2.815, and consequently one can reject the null that the two variables are equal. This implies that although a dictatorial regime may deliver a low level of political freedom it may at the same time allow for more civil liberties, or vice versa.
The rest of the regressors capture the other determinants of FDI as discussed in section 2. To capture the possible MS behaviour we introduce the countries’ log of real GDP per capita (GDPC) taken from the Penn World Tables (PWT, 2003). Moreover, MNEs may have incentives to invest in countries where local wages are low and openness to trade is high, so as to be able to produce at a lower cost and then export to other markets (de Haan and Sturm, 2003). To control for this motive we include as explanatory variables real GDP chain per worker (WAGE), acting as a proxy for wages in the host economy, and trade openness (OPEN, defined as exports plus imports over GDP). Data for both variables are taken from PWT (2003).
 Figure 1: The relationship between Political and Civil Liberties by Country.
Source: Freedom House (2003) Gastil index, Authors’ calculations

All other control variables are taken from IRIS (2000) and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.   To measure the absence of political risk by the possibility of "outright confiscation and forced nationalization" of property (IRIS, 2000), we add the variable NOEXPRISK.  Two other variables capture the quality of institutions in the host economy.  NOCORRUPTION measures the absence of demand for “illegal payments” in the form of “bribes” that "high government officials are likely to demand" (IRIS, 2000) and BURQUA measures the quality of the local bureaucracy as "an established mechanism for recruitment and training," with "autonomy from political pressure," and "strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services" when governments change (IRIS, 2000).  To capture the level of human capital in the economy we introduce the literacy ratio (LITERACY), with higher LITERACY implying a higher level of human capital in the host economy.   Finally, we introduce the percentage of roads paved (INFRASTR) as a measure capturing the existing infrastructure of the country.
In order to control for time invariable, country specific variables like legal system, natural resources, colonial ties, etc. we estimate the model using country specific Fixed Effects. In all specifications we found that the fixed effects are highly significant. Country specific factors apparently play an important role in affecting the investment decision​[5]​. 
Table 1 summarizes the variables used and their respective sources, while Appendix 2 provides summary statistics.


Table 1. Description of the Variables

Variable Name	Explanation	Source
FDIP	Foreign Direct Investment flows from US firms normalized by GDP	US Census Bureau of Economic Analysis and authors’ calculations
TOTFDIP	Total Foreign Direct Investment flows normalised by GDP	UNCTAD (2003)
GDPC	Gross Domestic Product per Capita	Penn World Table, 2003
OPEN	Imports plus Exports over GDP	Penn World Table, 2003 
WAGE	Real GDP chain per Worker	Penn World Table, 2003 
CIVILREP	Civil Liberties repression	Freedom House (2003) Gastil index
POLITREP	Political Liberties repression	Freedom House (2003) Gastil index
NOCORRUPTION	Corruption level of the economy	IRIS (2000)
BURQUA	Bureaucratic Quality of the economy	IRIS (2000)
NOEXPRISK	Expropriation Risks	IRIS (2000)
LITERACY	Literacy Ratio of Population	World Development Indicators, World Bank (2003)
INFRASTR	Percentage of Roads Paved	World Development Indicators, World Bank (2003)
FDI STOCK	Total Foreign Direct Investment Stock	UNCTAD (2003)


4. Results and interpretation
As a first step we replicate the results of Rodrik (1997) and Busse (2004). For this reason we create the variable DEMOCRACY defined as in Helliwell (1994):
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Test Country Effects (F-test)	74.61***	
Hausman		14.51*
N	530	530
Estimation	Fixed Effects, Robust Standard Errors	Unbalanced Random Effects
t-stats are in parentheses.*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%

The results of this first step are shown in Table 2. The qualitative results with respect to the democracy variable are the same as in previous studies. The democracy variable is insignificant, but when using the random effects estimation we get a positive sign for DEMOCRACY.  This seems to refute the hypothesis that less democratic countries tend to attract more foreign investment. 
We now turn to the case where we split democracy into POLITREP and CIVILREP. In Table 3 we present the results for the full sample, for the countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and then for the countries not belonging to the OECD​[6]​.
The results clearly support our hypothesis that CIVILREP and POLITREP give rise to dissimilar FDI incentives.  The two variables have different signs in the full sample and the non-OECD sample regressions, and the sensitivity analysis confirms that their signs are consistent.  The positive sign of CIVILREP variable confirms our hypotheses for the repression of civil liberties, whilst the POLITREP variable is negatively signed suggesting that US investors avoid countries with low political liberties.  Furthermore POLITREP emerges as negatively significant in the full sample and in the developing countries regression. The variable remains negative for the OECD sample, but it is not statistically significant perhaps due to the high and constant level of political liberties in these countries​[7]​.  


Table 3.  Results using different measures for political and civil liberties (Full Sample, OECD and non-OECD)




























Estimation	Fixed Effects, Robust Standard Errors	Unbalanced Random Effects	Fixed Effects, Robust Standard Errors	Unbalanced Random Effects	Fixed Effects, Robust Standard Errors	Unbalanced Random Effects
			Chow Test F(10,567)	(OECD – Non-OECD)	112.98	
t-stats are in parentheses.*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%

The coefficient of GDPC is positively statistically significant for the full sample and the non-OECD countries, capturing the market-seeking motive of US FDI.  This result is common in the literature (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Chakrabarti, 2001; Busse, 2004).  The coefficient of openness to trade is positive and significant for the OECD sample suggesting a trade complimentary effect on behalf of US investors.  Finally, the coefficient of WAGE is negative and statistically significant in all samples, mirroring the efficiency-seeking motive for FDI.  Our sensitivity analysis shows that among the economic variables used, openness to trade emerges consistently as a factor affecting US FDI decisions in OECD economies across all specifications​[8]​.
Also of particular importance are the results from the variables capturing the institutional framework, human capital and the infrastructure of the host economy.  NOCORRUPTION has a negative sign, indicating that US investors prefer to deal with a corrupted regime.  This result is consistent and remains significant throughout the different groups​[9]​.  
Higher levels of bureaucratic quality and lower levels of expropriation risk determine FDI decisions, especially in the Non-OECD countries sample where their significance level is higher than for the OECD sample.  Also of interest are the results for human capital and its role in influencing US FDI decisions.  Overall the LITERACY variable has a negative and statistically significant sign, but according to our sensitivity analysis, i.e. comparing the fixed-effects with the random-effects estimators (Bengoa and Sanchez- Robles, 2003), this is not consistent.  This means we cannot rely on the coefficient sign for drawing conclusions. Only for the OECD group, human capital emerges as a consistent factor that attracts FDI, mirroring perhaps the higher quality level of US FDI targeting OECD countries​[10]​ and thus the need for a qualified and educated labour force.  
Then the main question arising is whether the MNEs’ motives described in the theoretical framework and the previous section are the same in all cases of non-OECD countries, irrespective of the level of civil and political liberties.  Until now, the CIVILREP variable has a positive and statistically significant sign both in the Full sample and non- OECD specifications.  As we discussed in section 2, the relationship between civil liberties and the ability to attract FDI may be non- linear: a low level of repression of civil liberties is expected to have a positive effect on FDI flows, whereas a high level of repression may have a negative effect on FDI, through disincentive effects on the workforce. To test this hypothesis we split the developing countries sample with respect to the level of civil liberties​[11]​. In Table 4 we present the results for countries that have either high or low civil liberties. The breakpoint is taken to be when CIVILREP is equal to 3. The choice of this breakpoint level was based on testing which level of CIVILREP gave the more statistical significant different estimated coefficients​[12]​. The splitting of the sample is also confirmed by a standard Chow test.


Table 4.  Different levels of civil liberties (non-OECD countries only)





























Estimation	Fixed Effects,Robust Standard Errors	Unbalanced Random Effects	Fixed Effects,Robust Standard Errors	Unbalanced Random Effects	
	Chow Test (High Civil – Low Civil)F(40,414)		3.66		
t-stats are in parentheses.*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%

When MNEs invest in countries with a high-level of civil liberties, our argumentation for the different aspects of civil and political freedoms holds and is reflected in the different signs of the two variables, i.e. CIVILREP is positive and statistically significant and POLITREP is negative and statistically significant.  The positive sign of the former suggests that US investors have primarily an efficiency-seeking motive for FDI.  This is due to the repression of the activities of labour unions, interest groups etc.  This is also mirrored in the negative sign of the WAGE variable, which suggests that higher level of wages deter FDI.  This motive does not hold for countries with low civil liberties, i.e. CIVILREP larger or equal to 4.  Both variables measuring freedoms are non-statistically significant, probably due to the specific characteristics of the countries forming this group, i.e. these are the most autocratic and repressive regimes among the developing countries.  The only reason for investing in such a country is the seeking of raw materials and natural resources, or a market-seeking motivation through the existence of a prosperous elite, potentially captured by the positive and significant human capital variable.  The GDPC variable emerges as the driving force of US investments implying a primarily MS motive.  The OPEN variable is moreover positively signed suggesting an FDI strategy aiming at exporting raw materials or natural resources.  In this group of countries WAGE comes also forward as a significant factor for attracting FDI.  Extraction of natural resources does not require a highly productive but a cheap labour force.  The negative and statistically significant sign of WAGE and the non-statistical significance of CIVILREP reinforce this argument.  It is thus clear that the investment motives in the two groups are completely different.

5. Conclusions
The main motivation of this study is the blending of international business and the political economy literature in explaining US MNEs’ investments in developing countries. The motivations of MNEs for investing abroad may be quite distinct. Efficiency-seeking motives dominate the investment decisions in less liberal developing countries.  The repression of the activities of the labour unions and interest groups drives this effect.  In all other cases natural resource seeking and market seeking, through the existence of a prosperous elite, rule FDI decisions. 
From a normative point of view, the results presented here might be quite disturbing. FDI provides an important pool of investment in the process of the industrialisation of developing countries.  As our results show, a particular type of FDI can be attracted from countries where the civil liberties are (slightly) repressed. Then developing countries may face a vicious dilemma: to choose between low economic well-being (low growth) and low political well-being (low civil liberties). 
Our paper proposes a way out of this dilemma. FDI does not come necessarily under the form of efficiency-seeking activities. A country, therefore, may attract FDI by promoting the abilities and the knowledge of its local labour force. This process can only be accomplished with sound educational and other public policies and with a reasonable amount of civil and economic liberties. The final answer to the above dilemma may be policies in favour of democracy and towards attracting FDI that is motivated by other than  efficiency reasons. 
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APPENDIX 1: List of Countries (Transition Economies in bold)
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^1	  The typology of motivations used here adapts earlier approaches of Behrman (1984), Dunning (1993) and Filippaios et al. (2004)
^2	 For example, the specific nature of MS behaviour in W. Europe has evolved as individual countries have entered the EU (Tavares, 2001; Tavares and Pearce, 2001), whilst MS has proved to be a major reason for MNEs' initial operations in the CEE transition region (Lankes and Venables, 1996; Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1997).
^3	  The list of countries in our sample is given in Appendix 1.
^4	  To test the robustness of our results we also included time effects in our estimations but those were proved in most of the cases insignificant without altering in any way the results.  The results are available on request.
^5	  The presence of other foreign investors might also play an important role in the investment decision..  To account for that factor we included in our model the Total FDI Stock, irrespective of investor home country, in the economy, lagged by one time period.  The results obtained did not differ significantly from the ones presented in the next section and are available on request.
^6	  Similar results are obtained if countries are distinguished according to their income level. Also transition economies, the period 1989-1991 and outliers are not driving the results.  Results are available on request.
^7	  A non-linear version of the equation was also estimated, using the squared CIVILREP, which had the hypothesised positive sign but was insignificant for the full sample.  Results are available on request.
^8	  In Table 3, the LITERACY variable is positive and statistically significant for the OECD group. This result seems to be driven by the changes in a few countries with extreme changes in LITERACY (namely Portugal and Ireland).  For further information see Eurydice, 2000. When we estimated the equation for the OECD group, excluding these countries, the LITERACY variable became insignificant, without affecting the signs and the significance of the other variables in the equation. These results are available from the authors. 
^9	  Mendes and Sepulveda (2006) find a non- monotonic relationship between corruption and growth when restricting the sample to democratic countries. Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004) report a positive but insignificant relation between FDI and corruption when using a Corruption Perception Index. Hines (1995) fail to find a negative correlation between corruption and total FDI, Wheeler and Mody’s (1992) evidence about corruption and US FDI is inconclusive, whilst Wei (2000) reports a negative relation for a sample dominated by OECD countries.  Egger and Winner (2005) conclude that a positive association between corruption and FDI exists, whilst Busse and Hefeker (2006) confirm Wei’s result using a dynamic panel analysis.
^10	  A chow test between OECD and non-OECD results confirms that the two models are overall different.
^11	  To test the robustness of our results we also estimated the model with Total FDI flows as the dependent variable.  Results are available on request.
^12	  To choose among various breakpoints in our sample we also employed the Supremum F test, which involves estimating all Chow F statistics for each potential breakpoint in the sample and choosing the one where the F statistic was higher. When this test was implemented the breakpoint was determined at CIVILREP=4. The differences of the estimated coefficients among the two models (CIVILREP≤4 and CIVILREP<4) were not as statistically significant as the ones presented here. Further both R-squares were much lower than when the breakpoint was at CIVILREP=3.
